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Abstract  
The development of mankind in the present is characterized by transformation trends in the 
technological, economic, and social spheres. These trends impact the political environment as well. 
The challenges of the economic crisis, the migration processes revitalize the development of 
populism. The present paper is focused on political populism and its dimensions in Bulgaria. The 
political environment in the country is characterized by almost permanent merge of political entities, 
which gradually escalates the use of populist approaches, styles and rhetoric. The paper is 
structured in three methodologically interconnected parts, which respectively present: an overview 
of the process of politicization of the media and the mediatization of politics; a comparative study of 
the dimensions of populism in Bulgaria; a discussion on the connection between populism and the 
media, including a content analysis study conducted during the local elections of 2015.  
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1. Introduction 
Populism as a political position and rhetorical style has been the object of comprehensive research and 
multi-faceted social discussions. The strong critical attitude of populists towards the status quo, towards 
what they regard as the chimera of democracy, is generally intertwined with the function of the media to be 
a corrective factor with regard to government authorities. 
Research attention in Bulgaria has started to be focused on populism recently, but is increasing in 
terms of the engagement of scholars and the expansion of the range of study. This interest was determined 
by the successes of newly formed populist parties during the new century – parties of the harder or softer 
variants – which succeeded in periodically winning considerable numbers of places in national parliaments.   
The specificity of research on populism derives from the specific techniques and approaches used 
by populists. Among Bulgarian researchers, there is still no unanimity on populism and its specificity. Yet 
this does not mean there is no agreement that it involves “playing the role of the ordinary people”.  
Svetoslav Malinov (2007) defines populism as a form of political thought and speech, as a set of 
rhetorical figures and techniques, possessing a single leading characteristic: constant appeal and reference 
to the collective image of the “people”. This characteristic is complemented by features such as “offering 
what people want to be offered”, “brilliant promises”, “identifying oneself with, and speaking in the name of, 
the people”, etc., in the context of the seven propaganda techniques defined in the US in 1937 (How 1937).  
Daniel Smilov (2008, p. 26) suggests three aspects of the concept of populism: “At times it is used 
to describe the process of backsliding from the achievements of liberal democracy made before the 
accession to the EU. At other times, it refers to the growth of nationalist or radical right-wing parties. Almost 
everyone agrees with Cas Mudde that this is an ideology that places the people in opposition to the corrupt 
political elite.” 
The conceptual schemes of Margaret Canovan (1981) and Cas Mudde (2007) have been used as 
keys to understanding and explaining the phenomenon and defining populism in Bulgaria. Scholars have 
emphasized Mudde’s idea that “even if populism as an ideology is viewed as a basic threat, in fact the 
basic threat in Europe today is populism as a style” (Mudde 2007, p. 115).  
Bulgarian researchers stress the moral overtone of the phenomenon, related to categories such as 
truth, lie, manipulation, honesty, decency, sincerity, etc. They have debated whether populism is good or 
bad, whether or not it is a threat to democratic processes, etc. (Malinov 2007; Smilov 2008; Kabakchieva 
2009; Badzhakov 2010; Krastev 2007; Krasteva 2013, etc.).  
There is no consensus in academic circles regarding the types of populism present in society. In 
resting upon the four types of types of populism (complete, excluding, anti-elitist, and empty populism) 
outlined by Jagers & Walgrave (2006), and on the indicators for them, it may be concluded that these types 
exist in Bulgaria, although they have not been classified in the terminology used by these two authors. 
Nearly all parties in Bulgaria have displayed some populist manners and have flirted, to a greater 
or lesser degree, with the people, speculating on popular expectations.   
Populism in Bulgaria is visible in several variants of classification:  
 Classical, social, specifically “pro-European” populism;  
 Hard vs. soft populism;  
 Right-wing vs. left-wing populism. 
Classical populism coincides with the European, mostly xenophobic populism of the 1930s; social 
populism, considered to be left oriented, is associated primarily with the old left-wing parties and the newly 
formed leftward-inclined parties; while the specific “pro-European” populism is ascribed to newly formed 
parties with a liberal orientation.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 3 
Dobrinka Peicheva and Lilia Raycheva:a: Framing Political Populism in Contemporary Media Ecosystemm 
 
EQPAM Volume 6 No.4 October 2017  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916   
Hard populism has restructured itself in recent years to become a mixture of nationalist and 
extremist elements, with an accent on othering. 
The soft version of populism encompasses general appeals to people, catch-all politics and 
demagogic discourses.  
The elements of left and right populism are hybrid in nature. In reality, populism in Bulgaria is 
neither left nor right, because some of the outstanding parties falling under this category combine extreme 
left and extreme right practices along with hate speech.  
The discrepancy between economic expectations and reality, between political expectations and 
concrete policies, etc., as well as the presence of contrary evaluations of the transition to democratic 
society and market economy are the grounds of the varieties of populism in Bulgaria and of the difficulty of 
building a relevant conceptual framework for the phenomenon. It is not accidental that the most malicious 
manifestations of populist political actors, including in the media, have been organized after Bulgaria’s 
accession in the Euro-Atlantic structures and are a result of disappointment in the effects of this new 
situation.    
Ana Krasteva, referring to the comparative study of populism in Central and Eastern Europe made 
by Jacques Rupnik (Rupnik 2007, p. 130) and of the three main features he defines, has concluded that 
Bulgarian populism is a typical example of post-communist East European populism, and is highly imitative. 
“Extremism is not a spontaneous internal attitude but is a learned political game” (Krasteva 2013, p. 11).    
The goal of the present text is to examine the current developments of political populism in 
Bulgaria. It correlates with the goals of a broader research, conducted in 31 countries by COST IS 1308 
Action: Populist Political Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated 
Political Populism for Democratic Politics 
The article is structured in three methodologically interconnected parts, which respectively present: 
an overview of the process of politicization of the media and the mediatization of politics; a comparative 
study of the dimensions of populism in Bulgaria; a discussion on the connection between populism and the 
media, including a content analysis study conducted during the local elections in 2015.  
 
 
2. Politicization of Media and Mediatization of Politics  
Today changes in society are catalyzed by the opportunities provided by the blogosphere and the social 
networks, and by mobile electronic connections. Mediatized mobile communications have proven to be 
emblematic for mediatized society (Peicheva 2003).  
The rapid developments of ICT facilitate significant transformations in contemporary media 
ecosystem. The essential consequences of media convergence are connected with the status-quo of the 
new media hybrid products. Some of their applications contribute to the erosion of the media ecosystem, 
ex. these media products which contain combination of non-truths and half-truths, intolerant language, etc. 
in traditional and new media formats, thus contaminating media atmosphere. 
In the cotemporary communication environment political pluralism in Bulgaria experiences 
persistent difficulties. The still-in-the-make civil society fails to assist the creation of a stable public basis for 
professional journalism. According to the World Press Freedom Index 2016, Bulgaria has dropped down to 
113th place (out of 180 countries), which shows that freedom of speech and independent journalism is still a 
convertible phraseology for most of the media outlets and for many non-government organizations 
disbursing the funds of European and Transatlantic institutions (Reporters 2016).  
Data provided by the National Statistical Institute vividly show the trends in the media in the quarter 
of a century since the start of the transition period. Currently the number of print media amounts to 295 
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newspapers (55 dailies) with a total annual circulation of 315 712 000, and 668 magazines and bulletins, 
with an annual circulation of 27 831 000 (NSI 2015). In 2015, there were 337 radio stations and 187 
television channels operating on national, regional and local level terrestrially, via cable or via satellite, and 
listed in the public register of the Council for Electronic Media (Council 2015).  
The dynamics of the pre-election campaigns during the period of democratization since 1989 has 
been developing alongside demonopolization, liberalization and transformation of the media system. 
Deregulation of the radio- and TV broadcasting sector dragged on, giving way to the development of two 
mutually bound processes – politicization of media and mediatization of politics.  
For more than a quarter of a century, political, economic and social upheavals have significantly 
impacted the development of the mass media system in Bulgaria towards quick and flexible reactions to the 
social processes. The major significance of television was manifested in several critical situations during 
the years, including: the TV attack against President Petar Mladenov in 1990 that compelled him to resign; 
the resignation of the BSP Government headed by Andrey Lukanov in 1990; the mass media war launched 
by the UDF Government of Filip Dimitrov, which led to its toppling in 1992; the exit of the Government of 
Lyuben Berov (under the Movement for Rights and Freedom mandate) in 1994; the withdrawal of the BSP 
Government of Zhan Videnov in 1996; the siege of the House of the National Assembly in the situation of 
governmental crisis in 1997, which led to radical power shift; the forced restructuring of the UDF 
Government of Ivan Kostov in 1999, due to corruption allegations; the attacks that brought about ministerial 
replacements in the Simeon II Government in 2005 and in the three-party coalition (Coalition for Bulgaria, 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms and National Movement Simeon II) of Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev; 
the constant corrective activism with respect to the government of Boyko Borisov (Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria) and the wide coverage of the social protests which led to the earlier resignation 
of Borisov’s government in 2013; the coverage of the pressure of continuous social protests against the 
government of Plamen Oresharski (Coalition for Bulgaria), which also led to its premature resignation in 
2014 (Raycheva 2016).  
The country still lacks a stable foundation on which to test the maturity and professionalism of the 
media as regards providing voters the opportunity for informed choice under the conditions of 
representative democracy. The media are pushed away from democratic values and involved in the spiral 
of obscure political and corporative interests. As a result, although considerable progress has been made 
regarding the audiovisual quality of the political advertising products, the media system still fails to fulfil its 
major purpose in pre-election periods – to inform society impartially and on an equal footing about the 
participants in the political race and their platforms. 
 
 
3. Conceptualizing Populism in Bulgaria  
In spite of the fact that a considerable step towards democratization has been made after 1989, the political 
system, due to its non-clarified identity, both at conceptual and at representative level, faces an immense 
challenge with respect to keeping of appearances.  
The long years of one-party dominance were replaced by an ever-cropping host of new political 
parties, unions and organizations, which have been constantly splitting, regroupping, and entering into 
coalitions, especially on the eve of forthcoming elections. The breaking down of the bipolar model through 
some newly formed leader-type structures has failed to bring about sustainability to the political system, 
which is weighed down by heavy economic and social problems. The model of democracy on the make in 
Bulgaria delegated the difficult tasks of transition to the political elite and eliminated the broad participation 
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of the people in the process of transformation. Although superficially heterogeneous, the political and the 
media environment (especially in pre-election times) is still not open to the parameters of pluralism or 
independence (Raycheva, Petev 2003).  
 
3.1 Populist political actors  
Bulgarian political actors, including leaders and parties, that fall under the category of populism 
have mixed features.  
The use of populist phraseology is evident among all political parties in the country, whether left or 
right-oriented. Bulgarian political actors of a populist trend – including political leaders and parties – have 
mixed, oftentimes changing, characteristics.   
The factors favourable to the emergence and rise of populism in the country can be divided into 
internal and external.  
The external factors are related to globalization and the adherence of Bulgaria to the EU and 
NATO, while the internal ones are connected with social, ideological and political structuring.     
The social factors that open the way for, and support, populism are, on one hand, people’s 
disappointment in the transition to market economy and democratic forms of government, as well as in the 
inability of the elites to work for the public interest and build a well-functioning state, and, on the other hand, 
in the anti-minority attitudes of some Bulgarian citizens. “Bulgarian society is in a populist situation”, 
concludes Petya Kabakchieva (2008, p. 3). 
The ideological factors are related to the effacement of relevant dividing lines. “Policies draw closer 
together, the distinctions between left and right fade, the strong mobilization resources are nationalism and 
(anti)Europeanism” (Smilov 2008, p. 26). 
The political factors are also related to dissolving of differentiations. The political clash “is not 
between left and right, reformers and conservatives, the clash is between the elites having growing 
suspicions about democracy, and the angry society having increasingly anti-liberal attitudes. The left-wing 
party BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) is moving towards a centrist position, defends the Red oligarchs more 
than it does the poor and the middle class. Thus, the extreme left space remains unoccupied and the party 
Ataka settles in it, as well as other nationalist formations appealing for nationalization” (Krastev 2007, p. 
112). 
In Bulgaria, complete populism, involving reference and appeals to the people, anti-elitism and 
exclusion of outgroups (Jagers, Walgrave 2006), is called “hard” populism. It flourished after 2005, when 
the former journalist and leader of the newly formed party Ataka, Volen Siderov, succeeded in winning 
twenty seats for his party in the parliamentary elections. After 2005, members of Ataka have always been 
present in the National Assembly, and more recently, in the European Parliament as well. The ideology of 
the party tends to combine extremist right-wing with extreme left-wing ideas, and has evolved towards an 
anti-EU and anti-NATO stance. Its leader Siderov is a typical example of a very aggressive style combined 
with eclectic elements: he raises extreme left slogans referring to nationalization, but also spreads ethnic 
hostility and anti-elite feelings; recently he has been making anti-migrant and anti-globalist statements.   
Other small parties are also part of “hard” populism in Bulgaria, including the nationalist party 
Bulgarian National Union, the Bulgarian National Radical Party and, primarily present online, the Warriors 
of Tangra Movement and the party National Resistance, etc.  
According to the indicators of populism, parties that might be classified in the range of more limited 
populism are the Patriotic Front coalition, headed by Valeri Simeonov, who is also the president of the 
political party National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), and IMRO (the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement), headed by Krasimir Karakachanov; these 
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parties are currently part of the ruling coalition. They are nationalist parties that are more or less opposed to 
the minority groups, Roma, Turks, etc.   
Falling under the category of excluding populism, with its typical anti-elitism and appeals to the 
common people, is Nikolay Barekov’s pro-EU party Bulgaria without Censorship, which was widely 
publicized when formed early in 2014. In recent months, however, it has completely broken apart. Its leader 
Barekov, formerly a popular TV anchorman, is a salient example of a mixed type of political populism. He 
combines right-wing ideology with leftist slogans referring to protecting the interests of the poor. This is a 
typical case of populism based on unscrupulously “playing the role of the ordinary people”, making “brilliant 
promises”, and using the media for political purposes, turning them into political PR institutions. However, 
Barekov was later denounced by people from his own party in Parliament as being dependent on 
corporations. At present, he is a member of the European Parliament but has been abandoned by nearly all 
members of the Bulgaria without Censorship coalition; his parliamentary group now carries the name 
Bulgarian Democratic Centre.     
Falling under the category of empty populism, with its reference and appeals to the ordinary 
people, is the political activity of the former Bulgarian tsar Simeon II. In 2001, he became prime minister of 
Bulgaria, having won votes in the parliamentary elections through his populist phraseology. Simeon II and 
the party established in 2001 and named after him, the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS) is 
precisely falling in the category of “pro-European” populism that may be defined as “soft” populism as well. 
Simeon II has a specific style of communication marked by moderation in speech, a certain show of 
modesty and benevolence. These traits were part of his charisma. He has used a technique never applied 
before him in Bulgarian politics: “the technique of non-speech” (Krasteva 2013, Malinov 2007). His political 
style and conduct towards others are based on respect and compromise. Specific for him is the style of 
catch-all politics. Thus the former tsar included ministers of different party affiliations in his government, and 
during his second mandate, he entered into coalition with the former Communists of the BSP, whose 
opponent he initially was.  
The present Bulgarian prime-minister Boyko Borisov, who also held a previous mandate (2009-
2013), also falls in the category of “soft” populism. His is a very particular style. He displays a certain 
amount of eclecticism, making references to the common people, yet also tending to discredit opponents.  
Eclecticism and aggressiveness is common to the verbal style of all “excluding” populists and to 
those with anti-elitist views.   
Charisma is the common feature of populist leaders, which distinguishes them from other party 
leaders and explains the high election results their parties have achieved at various times. Charismatic 
leaders present themselves, and are perceived, as father figures, who personify the messages of the 
respective party. The political plan of Simeon II in 2001 to try to “Europeanize” Bulgaria within 800 calendar 
days was a personalized plan, as is Volen Siderov’s plan to de-colonize Bulgaria from Europe. Attraction, 
not repulsion, is the symbolic resource of Simeon II underlying his charisma; to the opposite, Siderov’s 
charisma is based on aggressiveness and negation.   
Today, the populist stage of parliament is held mainly by Volen Siderov, though support for his 
party Ataka has decreased. The Patriotic Front coalition, made up of the political party NFSB, and IMRO, is 
also represented in Parliament and is part of the ruling coalition. The NMSS, renamed National Movement 
Stability and Progress since 2008, is waning and is not represented in Parliament. Support for Bulgaria 
without Censorship has strongly declined.  
 
3.2 Media and Populism 
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Historical roots, the deteriorating social-economic situation, ideological assumptions, and the 
financial dependence of certain media groups on concrete parties, are all especially important factors for 
the intense growth of populism in the political life of the country.   
Thus, the media-related origin of the political formation called Ataka is typical for populist 
leadership and style of politics. The high viewing rates for Volen Siderov’s ten-minute show entitled “Ataka”, 
broadcast on TV SKAT since 2003, is connected with the appearance of the eponymous political party and 
the position it won in politics in 2005. It is believed that the growth of this party and its membership was due 
to this political broadcast. Contributing to success was likewise its national daily party newspaper, also 
called “Ataka”.  Later on, the appearance of TV Alfa in 2011, after Siderov broke his relations with TV 
SKAT, contributed to the continuing support for Ataka and its leader over the years. The party would hardly 
have won enough votes to send its representatives to the parliament if its populist slogans had not reached 
the viewers and readers of these nationally disseminated media.  
Similarly, the emergence of the populist party Bulgaria without Censorship, created in 2014 by the 
journalist Nikolay Barekov, was accompanied by opinion poll results furnished by concrete survey 
agencies, in combination with the support of TV 7, of which Barekov had been executive director before 
undertaking a political career.     
Other media have also contributed to the expansion of populism. Some non-governmental 
organizations, marketing agencies and associations have also promoted interest constructing this 
mediatized reality (Peicheva 2011). 
“From the very start of the changes, especially after the democratic forces came to power and soon 
fell in 1992, the media have sent suggestive messages that ‘they are all scoundrels’, ‘politics is a dirty 
business’, ‘the parties are corrupt’, ‘parliament is nothing but palaver’. Populist attitudes and frenzies were 
purposely being fomented by the media” (Badzhakov 2010, p. 132). 
With regard to fomenting populist hate speech and constructing the “image of the enemy”, some 
national media have evidently played a role in stimulating populist processes by serving as a platform for 
plainly racist and misanthropic populist vocabulary (Spasov 2014).  
In developing dynamically, the media also create a variety of forms used for political presentation.  
Populism is expanding in entertainment television as well, thereby leading some theorists to announce the 
start of a new populist practice based on the electronic media – show populism (Kabakchieva 2009, p. 1). 
Hardly any political leader fails to be present in the new media, including blogs, social networks, 
sites of political parties, online television. Theoretical and empirical analyses particularly emphasize the 
impact of populists on the online sphere. However, the activities of the Internet trolls in online discussion 
forums that aimed basically at provoking the user, has not yet become a topic of researchers (Raycheva 
2013).  
 
 
4. Specifics of the dimensions of political populism in the media 
In order to verify the characteristic features of the hard populism in Bulgaria, described as a mixture of 
nationalist and discriminatory elements that emphasizes “othering” and combines this with hate speech, 
and of soft populism, which comprises general appeals to people, catch-all politics and demagogic 
discourses, a content analysis study was conducted on the topic of “Populist dimensions of pre-election 
political reality – local elections 2015”. The study was developed within the Scientific Seminar on Media and 
Education and the Laboratory of Sociology of Assoc. Prof. DSc Dobrinka Peicheva at the Neofit Rilski 
Southwest University, Blagoevgrad.  
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4.1 Method  
The content analysis was focused on pre-election communication units disseminated through the 
channels of the public television broadcaster – the Bulgarian National Television BNT1, BNT2 and BNT 
Svyat [World] (25.09 – 23.10. 2015). The choice of public television was based on the existence of an 
official Agreement on coverage of the pre-election campaign for conducting elections for mayors and 
municipal councilors, concluded between BNT and the authorized representatives of parties, coalitions of 
parties, and initiative committees (BNT, 2015). The main already existing and newly created information 
and discussion programs to be studied were specified beforehand in the Agreement: The Voices of 
Bulgaria, The Day Begins. More from the Day, Referendum, Panorama. Local Time, etc.      
The content analysis was effectuated by means of a specially designed registration card including 
thematic categories and traits for observation and registration. The study goal was to identify populist 
elements in the campaign image of the basic parliamentary represented and functioning parties and 
coalitions in Bulgaria.   
The political forces to be studied were the currently active parties and coalitions represented in the 
Parliament: the coalition Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABR), the political party Ataka, the coalition 
Bulgarian Socialist Party – Left Bulgaria (BSP-LV), the political party Citizens for European Development of 
Bulgaria (CEDB), the political party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the coalition Patriotic Front, 
and the coalition Reformist Bloc.   
 
4.2 Results 
The pre-election campaign of BNT was positioned mostly in the primetime and after – over 55%, 
but covered, in smaller portions, also other temporal segments as well: 16.30-19.00 h. – 19,9%; 7.30-9.00 
h. - 19%; and 12-13 h. - 3%.  
52,6% of the communication units were concentrated in the TV program The Voices of Bulgaria. 
They provided the voters with information consisting primarily in reporting on pre-election events held 
during the day in different settlements of the country. The communication units, related to political debates 
about the present and future of local government, in which populist appeals were most salient were 
concentrated mainly in the information and discussion TV programs The Day Begins, More from the Day, 
Referendum, Panorama, etc. 
 
Hard populism was observed and measured in several category groups. 
Nationalist ideas, in different variations, were found to be prevalently typical for the representatives 
of the party Ataka (44%), but occurred to a high degree among representatives of the coalition Patriotic 
Front as well (42,8%).  
Hostility towards others, as another dimension of hard populism, related to ethnic groups, refugees, 
the elite, etc., was also typical for the party Ataka. The share of this party (28,6%) was higher than the 
shares of all other political forces.   
Intolerance towards political parties, representatives of government instutitions, ethnic and minority 
groups, etc., also had high rates in the activities of Ataka. A relatively high degree of intolerance was 
displayed also by the Patriotic Front coalition. 
Confrontation as an attitude towards political opponents, in contrast with willingness to conduct 
dialogue, was likewise most strongly displayed by the political party Ataka with 71,5%, compared with a 
total of  20,4% for all other parties.  
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Elements of extremism were most strongly present in the style of political conduct. The results of 
the political party Ataka were generally highest in the ranking with respect to this trait, followed by the 
representatives of the Patriotic Front coalition. Although the prevalent behavior of the Patriotic Front 
coalition was not aggressive, itsr indicators were nearly twice higher than the total of the other parties, 
excluding Ataka. 
 
 
Table 1. Style of conduct of parties displaying “hard populism” 
Style of conduct 
 
Ataka (%) Patriotic Front 
(%) 
Total for other 
Parties (%) 
Emphatic 
aggressiveness 
7,7 21,4 12,5 
Partial 
aggressiveness 
15,4 14,3 14,5 
Emphatic tolerance 7,7 12,3 16,6 
Partial tolerance 17,5 9,2 12,5 
Neutrality 44 35,7 18,8 
 
Aggression demonstrated by extreme populist parties is targeted primarily at the migrants, ethnic 
minorities and political opponents.  
 
The soft form of populism was observed among all parties.  
The ranking regarding reliance on the people, as one of the dimensions of soft populism, was 
headed by the political party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) with 30%, followed by the then 
ruling Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB), with 28,9% and the coalition Reformist Bloc, 
with 26,3%. 
Flirting with the people was registered foremost among the coalition Alternative for Bulgarian 
Revival (ABR), with 22%, followed by CEDB, with 18,9 %, and MRF, with 18 %. 
Identifying with the people was most typical for the ABR coalition, with 31%, followed by the 
Patriotic Front coalition, with с 23,5 %. 
The use of colloquial style of speech had the highest values among CEDB – 27,9 %, while 
demonstration of dependence on the people was highest among the Reformist Bloc – 31,6 %. 
Brilliant promises were also observed in the registered pre-election populism of nearly all political 
forces, with the following priorities in the political promises: 
- Anti-corruption environment. The highest values were observed in the promises of the Patriotic 
Front coalition - 31,2% and the political party Ataka - 21,4%. 
- Asking the people on issues was promised to the greatest degree by the Reformist Bloc coalition 
– 26,9%, the political party CEDB – 20 % and the Patriotic Front coalition - 20%. 
- Transparency of the future governance had the relatively lowest value in the ranking of promises. 
The highest – 20 %, in this dimension gained the representatives of the Reformist Bloc coalition, followed 
by the coalition ABR, the coalition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) – Left Bulgaria, and the political party 
Ataka. Regarding transparency, the representatives of MRF had a negligible value – 1. 6%. 
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Table 2. Indicators of soft populism (in percentage) 
 АBR Ataka BSP-LB MRF CEDB Patriotic 
Front 
Reformists 
Block 
Reliance on the people 15,4 25,4 24,1 30 28,9 11,7 26,3 
Flirting with the people  22 16,6 10,3 18 18,9 17,7  
Identifying with the people  31 15,4 15,5 20 4,4 23,5 10,5 
Using colloquial style of 
speech  
15,4 7,1 13,8  27,9 17,7 7,9 
Displaying dependence on 
the people      
7,7 7,1 15,5 16  17,7 31,6 
Recalling the failure of 
those who have forgotten 
the  people    
8,5 23 12 4 2,2 11,7 10,5 
Other    1,7 4 4,4   
Lack of populist  behavior            5,4 7,1 8 13,3  13,2 
 100 
 
100 100 
 
100 100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
 
All the listed promises had highest values among the coalition ABR – 44% and the political party 
Ataka – 35,7%, while other promises besides the listed ones were registered among the political parties 
MRF - 34,7%, CEDB - 24,4% and the coalition BSP-Left Bulgaria – 18,8%. 
 
 
Table 3. Indicators of brilliant promises (in percentage)  
 ABR Ataka BSP-LB MRF CRDB Patriotic 
Front 
Reformists 
Block 
Anti-corruption environment  7,7 21,4 12,5 15,4  31,2 14,3 
Transparent governance 15,4 14,3 14,5 1,6 11,1 6,7 20 
Consultation with the 
people  
7,7 12,3 16,6 3,9 20 20 26,9 
Practical orientations 17,5 9,2 12,5 11,6 24,4 26,7 15,4 
All of these  44 35,7 18,8 3,9 9 7,7 17 
None of these  7,7 7,1 6,3 28,9 11,1 7,7  
Other…   18,8 34,7 24,4  6,4 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
The extreme forms of hard populism with all of their dimensions were displayed primarily by the 
political party Ataka and by the Patriotic Front coalition.   
As for soft populism, it was present in all of the examined political forces.   
The public political conduct of the candidates or of the leaders supporting them display the whole 
labeled variety of populism in Bulgarian practices.  
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5. Conclusion 
The contradictions in the existing terminology, the national specifics of theorizing on populism, the practices 
of the Bulgarian political leaders, and the results of the content analysis of the political electoral campaign 
in the local elections of 2015 bring to the fore several sets of discussion topics.     
Firstly, the identification of anti-elitism and its manifestations.  
Is it true that the negative attitude towards those labeled as “elite” – including politicians, 
corporation members, bankers, oligarchs, businesspersons, etc. – is an expression of populism, as some 
European researchers claim, or does it rather represent a general denial of their elite quality? Is it not true 
that there is a widespread strong disapproval of the drastic dividing lines – in terms of wealth, power, 
governance – between them and other significant people, such as scientists, poets, artists, musicians, 
dramatists, medics, teachers, engineers, journalists, etc. (who, in the traditional perception of people, 
represent the authentic elites)? Is not the dubious and corrupt behaviour of a considerable part of those 
who are labeled “elite” a strong justification for the growing dislike towards such people throughout the 
world? That is why the answers to these questions should be sought upon making corrections in the 
interpretation of this public intolerance as a form of populism. The deepening dividing lines can hardly be 
easily accounted for only in terms of populism. Such an understanding rather appears to be a subtle way to 
disregard the existing contradictions by placing them in a different framework of explanation. Elite status 
should generally be accompanied by intellect, creativity, spirituality, respect, upholding of principles, 
honesty, etc. Are these characteristics typical for the elite under consideration?   
Secondly, it is also a debatable question whether nationalism, racism, and xenophobia should be 
placed within the framework of populism. These are separate political ideologies and prejudices, and their 
self-reliance can hardly be questioned. The fact that they are applied in the rhetoric and programs of 
political leaders and parties can hardly change their specific nature.    
Thirdly, the characteristic features of propaganda are “poured” into terminology relevant to 
populism. In our times, nearly all the above-mentioned seven propaganda techniques defined as far back 
as 1937 have been placed in the international research framework regarding populism. In this sense, the 
classification of populism into different types seems an artificial approach, given that the phenomenon 
manifests itself is a mixture of critique, specific ideologies, stereotypes, insinuations, etc.   
This discussion comes in response to the practical activities of political leaders and to the restless 
attempts at conceptualizing the phenomenon of populism.    
Media convergence that facilitates hybrid media products and makes hybriditization the rule rather 
than the exception in journalism practices revealed the processes of media erosion. Media convergence 
and the changed patterns of media practices are accompanied by a disruption of the media ecosystem. 
The results of the content analysis and the existing ambiguity in the conceptual framework support 
the standpoint that populism can be adequately identified in cases where speculation occurs with the 
unrealistic expectations of people, when politicians irresponsibly speak in the name of the people, or when 
they irresponsibly make promises.  
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